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The affirmative action program launched by the Fiji Government in 
2002 espoused a ‘50/50 by 2020’ vision; that is, by the year 2020, some 
50 per cent of all economic activities would be owned by the indigenous 
population. The surprising impact of this heavy-handed redistribution of 
income and wealth from the non-indigenous to the indigenous population 
has been poverty-raising. One in eight in the population lived in poverty 
in 1977, the figure had risen to one in four by 1990/91 and one in three 
by 2002/2003; and on current trends, would reach one in two (that is 50 
per cent) by 2020. Such an outcome would be a direct consequence of 
these redistributive policies. While the politics of redistribution may have 
been compelling, its economic costs, including the impact on poverty, are 
devastating. The 2006 military takeover was executed to rid the country 
of corruption and race-based politics. Achieving these goals may have a 
bonus in terms of reversing the rise in poverty. Only time will tell.
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Poverty in Fiji has been increasing over 
time.1 Both the incidence (that is the 
proportion of people living in poverty) and 
the severity of poverty (that is, the difference 
between the poverty line and the mean 
income of the poor) increased between the 
three Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys (HIES); those of 1977, 1990/91, and 
2002/03. The rise in poverty, however, was 
accompanied by an improvement in the 
Human Development Index (HDI) for the 
nation as a whole. Average life expectancy 
at birth rose from 60.6 years in 1970 to 67.8 
years by 2004, per capita GDP has grown at 
an annual average rate of one per cent since 
1975, reaching a purchasing power parity 
(PPP) figure of F$6,066 by 2004, and the adult 
literacy rate as of 2003 was 93 per cent as 
compared to 88.6 per cent in 1990. The HDI, an 
aggregate of these variables, climbed steadily 
from 0.663 in 1975 to 0.758 by 2004 (UNDP 
2006). The simultaneous rise in the HDI and 
the incidence of poverty suggests two things: 
first that the benefits of development have 
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been unevenly distributed; and, second that 
the poor have lost ground, possibly falling 
into deepened pockets of disadvantage. The 
rise in poverty accompanying modest growth 
in the economy is evidence of failure of the 
many pro-poor policy pronouncements of 
the past.2
The rise in poverty is likely to continue 
given a slowing economy, and the eviction of 
many rural farmers from land with expired 
leases. Government-sponsored redistribution 
has been based on ethnicity under the (false) 
premise that only the indigenous population 
is poor. Furthermore, the affirmative action 
polices have lent themselves to abuse such 
that the redistribution has driven a wedge 
between the rich and the poor in both of the 
major ethnic groups. Indigenous Fijians who 
have been able to access public handouts 
were anything but poor. These transfers 
have been at the expense of the poorest Indo-
Fijians who lack the capacity to fund goods 
and services that are provided from the 
public purse to the indigenous population. 
The politics of redistribution suits the élite—
the indigenous Fijian élite in particular—as 
it legitimises the transfers to them but is 
couched as helping the ‘poor Fijians’. The 
Indo-Fijian élite, many with long-established 
links to the government, and/or the means 
to circumvent (and even benefit from) the 
discriminatory policies have little to lose 
from affirmative action programs.
The middle class, constituting mostly 
professional and trade personnel, comprise 
the majority of the taxpayers and thus have 
funded most of the public handouts. The 
mobile amongst this group, not surprisingly, 
have chosen to seek opportunities abroad. 
This exodus, while initially comprising 
Indo-Fijians, has now spilled across to 
indigenous Fijians with some of the loss 
of human capital being compensated for 
via rising receipts of remittance income. As 
of 2006, remittance receipts had reached 
some F$400 million. A middle-class bulge 
is healthy for an economy as it is the largest 
source of tax revenues, comprises the most 
productive of the workforce, and is often a 
source of demand for improved governance. 
The loss of this group, therefore, is to the cost 
of each of the above-mentioned. While some 
level of emigration has been taking place 
since the 1960s, the levels of emigration 
nearly doubled following the first coup of 
1987 and with spikes in the numbers leaving 
after each of the next two coups (Chandra 
and Chetty 1996; Asia Pacific Migration 
Research Network n.d.). The coups no 
doubt have been responsible for hollowing 
out the middle of the economy and thus 
contributing to the rising trend in poverty 
of the past two decades.
Poverty viewed via the ethnic lens
Contrary to the claims of the recently ousted 
government in justifying affirmative action 
programs for the indigenous population, 
poverty pervades all communities in 
Fiji. Importantly, there is no discernable 
statistical difference in the levels of poverty 
between Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians. 
Redistributions based on the ethnicity of 
the recipient, therefore, are likely to be 
ineffective and, as argued in the next section, 
even counterproductive. 
Before presenting evidence on poverty 
levels, let me define (absolute) poverty. A 
household or individual is considered to 
be in absolute poverty when they lack the 
income to afford the minimal bundle of food 
and shelter, that is, the basic necessities of 
life, for healthy living. Food poverty refers 
to the situation where the individual lacks 
the means to acquire the minimal dietary 
requirements for healthy living. Food 
poverty in the form of abject destitution that 
is visible in parts of Asia and Africa is not 
yet evident in Fiji, but there are many within 
the community who live hand-to-mouth 
and thus are highly vulnerable to falling 
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into food-poverty. Furthermore, social 
welfare payments from the government 
have provided only a limited safety net to 
the most disadvantaged in society.
Statistics on the level of poverty have 
been compiled from analysis of household 
level data, collected via the comprehensive 
HIES of 1977, 1990/91, and 2002/03. The 
compilation of poverty statistics involves 
computing the poverty line, counting the 
number of people below this line to reach 
the headcount measure, and working out 
the gap between the average income of 
those in poverty and the poverty line as 
the measure of the severity of poverty. 
The poverty line establishes the minimum 
income a household needs to provide for 
its basic needs; it thus takes into account 
the composition of the consumption basket 
as well as the price and quantities of each 
of the items within this basket. It is only 
a threshold in terms of the minimum 
purchasing power necessary to fund the 
minimal requirements for healthy living; 
however, it makes no assumption regarding 
how the income is expended. An income less 
than the poverty line is interpreted as the 
particular household being in poverty.
In contrast to the concept of absolute 
poverty defined above, relative poverty (that 
is, income inequality) refers to the situation 
where a part of the population has a much 
smaller share of national income than 
the rest of the population.3 However, this 
says nothing about whether these people 
are in absolute poverty. As an example, a 
household with an income in the bottom 
20 per cent of the income distribution may 
be considered relatively poor but this says 
nothing about their capacity, or otherwise, 
of acquiring the minimal necessities for 
healthy living. For the purposes of this 
article, unless otherwise stated, poverty will 
mean absolute poverty.
Based on the diets of the population 
in 1977 and the costs of basic necessities 
then, some 11.6 per cent of the population 
was in poverty in 1977. Using the same 
methodology but now with an appropriately 
constructed poverty line, some 25.5 per cent 
of the population was in poverty with 
some 10 per cent of the households in food-
poverty in 1990/91 when the next HIES 
was conducted (UNDP 1996:33). In the 14 
years between the two surveys of 1977 
and 1990/91, poverty rose by an annual 
average of one percentage point a year. As 
regards the ethnic composition of those 
in poverty, some 31 per cent of the Indian 
households had incomes below the poverty 
line while the corresponding figure for Fijian 
households was 27.6 per cent. Furthermore, 
the flat income distribution around the 
poverty line in 1990/91 implied that a large 
proportion of households were vulnerable 
to falling into poverty with a deterioration 
in economic conditions.
The absence of detailed analysis of 
poverty by ethnicity in 1977 precludes 
comparisons with the 1990/91 data in terms 
of any changes in the ethnic mix of the poor, 
but these comparisons can be made between 
the HIES of 1990/91 and 2002/03. However, 
one comparison, that of average daily wages 
between 1977 and 1990 is suggestive of 
the deteriorating economic conditions for 
those who drew their income from the sale 
of labour alone. The average real (that is, 
inflation adjusted) daily wage rate of 1990 
was only 62 per cent of the corresponding 
figure for 1970 (UNDP 1994). While per 
capita GDP grew by an average of one per 
cent per annum in the two decades following 
independence, wages fell by approximately 
2 per cent a year in this period.
The Fiji Poverty Report, produced by the 
UNDP together with the government (UNDP 
1997) drew the attention of policymakers 
to the plight of the poor and the need to 
reverse the worsening trends in poverty. The 
government announced its determination to 
reduce poverty from the levels observed in 
PovErty  and  rEdiStriButivE  PoliticS  in  PoSt-indEPEndEncE  fiji
25
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 22 Number 2 2007 © Asia Pacific Press
1990/91; it announced that sustained growth 
of the economy was the key instrument to 
be used to enable the disadvantaged to enter 
the workforce and lift themselves out of 
poverty (Fiji 1993, 1996b). Jobs growth was 
to be the central plank of the strategy. In 
addition, the public sector was to concentrate 
its efforts on providing basic services and the 
regulatory conditions for private enterprise. 
However, the record on each of these goals 
is less than enviable. 
Poverty is pervasive across the two 
major ethnic groups. The Fiji Poverty Report, 
for example, notes that ‘[t]he data on poor 
households…revealed that poverty is 
not concentrated in one particular sector, 
being neither predominantly rural or 
urban, nor exclusive to one ethnic group, 
but pervades all communities and areas’ 
(UNDP 1997:103). According to the report, 
the poorest in Fiji were those who earned 
income from doing menial (unskilled) jobs, 
had poor access to land or had little security 
to the land they occupied, and had no other 
sources of income. 
This  conc lus ion  regarding  the 
pervasiveness of poverty across the major 
two ethnic groups is reaffirmed by the 
more recent analysis of the 2002/03 HIES 
data. Abbott (2007) notes that ‘[a]mongst 
Fijian households the proportion having 
per capita incomes below the BNPL [basic 
needs poverty line] is estimated at 29.0 per 
cent (33.8 per cent of the Fijian population) 
and 30.7 per cent for Indian households 
(34.9 per cent of the Indian population)’ 
(Abbott 2007:22). 
The incidence of poverty across the 
two major ethnic groups is not too different 
between the HIES of 2002/03 and that of 
1990/91. In terms of basic needs, some 
33.8 per cent of the Fijian population 
was in poverty in 2002/03, an increase 
from 27.7 per cent for 1990/91, while the 
corresponding figure for Indo-Fijians was 
34.9 per cent and 31.0 per cent in 2002/03 
and 1990/91, respectively. 
According to the HIES of 2002/03, some 
38.1 per cent of the rural population and 
31.8 per cent of the urban population was 
Table 1 Incidence of poverty, 1990/91 and 2002/03 (per cent of population)
 Per cent of population having an adult equivalent  
 per capita income less than the  
 Basic Needs Poverty Line
 1990/91 2002
National average 25.5 34.4 
 Indigenous Fijian 27.7 33.8 
 Indo-Fijian 31.0 34.9
Urban average 27.6 31.8 
 Indigenous Fijian .. 29.9 
 Indo-Fijian .. 33.9
Rural average 24.3 38.1 
 Indigenous Fijian .. 37.3 
 Indo-Fijian .. 39.2
Source: Abbott, D.F., 2007. Fiji analysis of the 2002/03 household income and expenditure surveys: estimation 
of basic needs poverty lines and incidence of poverty in Fiji, Draft Final Report, prepared for United Nations 
Development Programme, Suva (unpublished):23.
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in poverty compared to the corresponding 
figures of 27.6 per cent for the urban 
population and 24.3 per cent for the rural 
population as of the 1990/91 HIES. While 
the 1990/91 HIES data does not disaggregate 
rural and urban poverty by ethnicity, the 
2002/03 HIES data shows that some 33.9 
per cent of urban Indo-Fijians and 29.9 per 
cent of urban indigenous Fijians were in 
poverty, while the corresponding figures for 
the rural population was 39.2 per cent for 
Indo-Fijians and 37.3 per cent for indigenous 
Fijians (UNDP 2006:3).
As of 2002/03, Indo-Fijian households 
comprised some 46 per cent of the total 
population but accounted for some 47 per 
cent of those in poverty. Indigenous Fijian 
households accounted for 50 per cent of the 
total household population and some 51 per 
cent of those in poverty. Thus, Indo-Fijian 
households were slightly over represented 
within the population of poor households. 
At least in statistical terms, it is not correct 
to suggest that the incidence of poverty 
was higher amongst indigenous Fijians 
compared to Indo-Fijians in either of the 
two recent HIES.
Income inequality amongst Indo-Fijians 
is greater than that amongst indigenous 
Fijians. According to income figures from 
the HIES of 1990/91, indigenous Fijian 
households had an average weekly income 
of F$173.65, some 13 per cent lower than 
the national average of F$199.31; Indo-
Fijian households had an average income 
of F$217.89 (some 9 per cent above the 
national average); and, ‘Other’ households 
had an average income of F$271.08 (some 36 
per cent above the national average). While 
Indo-Fijian households had a higher average 
income than their Fijian counterparts, they 
also had greater income inequality. The 
1990/91 Gini coefficient for Indo-Fijians was 
0.51 compared to that of indigenous Fijians 
of 0.39; reflected by the overrepresentation 
of Indo-Fijians on the extreme ends of 
the income distribution in the data. Indo-
Fijian households had incomes below 
their indigenous Fijian counterparts at 
each of the deciles until the median when 
the comparisons flip around (Table 2). 
These conclusions hold for the 2002/03 
HIES where rural Indo-Fijians had a per 
capita adult equivalent weekly income of 
Table 2 Average weekly household income and average per capita income, 1990/91 (F$)
  Average household income Average per capita income
Ten per cent group Indo-Fijian Fijian Indo-Fijian Fijian
1 32.40 38.10 7.10 8.10 
2 60.80 67.60 13.60 13.60 
3 81.60 89.80 17.80 17.50 
4 101.10 107.00 22.10 21.50 
5 124.20 126.70 27.30 28.60 
6 152.50 147.60 32.60 30.40 
7 186.70 175.10 40.90 36.20 
8 240.60 217.60 52.50 44.40 
9 327.90 288.00 74.80 60.20 
10 914.40 537.10 227.60 131.00
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 1997. Fiji Poverty Report, United Nations Development 
Programme and Government of the Republic of Fiji Islands, Suva:25.
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F$46.18 compared to the corresponding 
figure for indigenous Fijians of F$49.97 
and that for the nation as whole of F$48.57. 
Urban Indo-Fijians, in contrast, had a per 
capital adult equivalent weekly income 
of F$70.91 compared to the corresponding 
figure for indigenous Fijians of F$68.93 and 
a national average of F$72.43.4 The over 
representation of Indo-Fijian households 
on both extremes of the income distribution 
combined with the limited access to natural 
resources by them as a whole would have 
left the disadvantaged Indo-Fijians highly 
vulnerable to abject poverty. Access to land 
is critical for the poorest households. The 
HIES data shows that households below 
the food poverty line were found to be 
disproportionately concentrated in the 
squatter settlements and in urban villages.
In terms of changes in the incidence of 
poverty, the HIES data show that poverty in 
rural areas has risen significantly, increasing 
from an estimated 24.3 per cent of the rural 
population in 1990/91 to 38.1 per cent by 
2002/03. However, the difference in the 
incidence of poverty in rural areas between 
the Fijian (37.3 per cent) and Indian (39.2 per 
cent) populations is only marginal.
There is considerable evidence of the 
presence of a poverty trap in Fiji, a problem 
that may have been accentuated by the 
redistributive policies of past governments. 
The long-term poor are characterised by a 
lack of secure means of livelihood, limited 
access to skills and education, and restricted 
access to land and other natural resources. 
Female-headed households were found to 
be at a particular disadvantage. Children 
from resource-poor schools and families 
have had the greatest tendencies to fail 
external examinations and thus drop out 
of the education system. UNDP (1997), for 
example, notes that at least 30 per cent of all 
the children who dropped out of primary 
schools did so because of financial pressure. 
A premature end to education with limited 
access to alternate income earning assets 
can be a life sentence into poverty and 
with little hope of escape for subsequent 
generations. 
The data shows that while poverty has 
increased over time, the incidence of poverty 
is not greater amongst indigenous Fijians 
compared to Indo-Fijians. The rural sector 
has a higher percentage of poor households 
but there is no discernable difference in the 
incidence of poverty between Indo-Fijians 
and indigenous Fijians. The government’s 
policies for poverty reduction, as shown 
later, have claimed otherwise in justifying 
their affirmative action programs.
Redistribution and growth of the 
economy
Nearly every government handout since 
independence has been undertaken through 
the lens of ethnicity. For example, access to 
government contracts, business licenses, 
scholarships for tertiary study and import 
licenses have all been allocated on the basis 
of ethnicity. While access to privileges 
afforded by the taxpayers on the basis of 
ethnicity dates back to the 1874 when Fiji 
was ceded to Britain, redistributive policies 
founded on ethnicity have taken on added 
significance since independence in 1970 
and particularly following the first coup in 
1987. The first Governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur 
Gordon, on taking office on 10 October 1874 
made a decision to minimise the impact of 
colonisation on the indigenous population. 
Governor Gordon banned alienation of 
land, established indirect rule via the 
traditional chiefs, and, in the process, created 
a Fijian aristocracy with a vested interest 
in maintaining a system introduced at 
colonisation. In taking this stance, Governor 
Gordon was influenced by the traumatic 
experiences of the indigenous people under 
colonisation in Africa, Australasia, and the 
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Caribbean. However, he had to ensure that 
the economy grew in order to enable Fiji to 
fund its public provisions. His immediate 
challenge was in effectively governing a 
large and dispersed archipelagic colony 
(Ward 1995; Gillion 1962).
Immigrant labour was brought in to 
grow the economy whilst quarantining 
the indigenous workers to their traditional 
ways of life in the villages. The majority of 
the migrants brought in after colonisation 
were indentured labourers, some 61,000 
from India, to work on then European-
owned plantations. The ban on alienation 
of land brought a halt to expansion of 
plantation agriculture; but with Fiji’s 
rich and abundant tropical land and an 
administration loathe to draw indigenous 
labour into the modern economy, this placed 
an even larger premium on a ready supply 
of resident labour. Indian migrants and their 
progeny filled this void; while they were 
encouraged by the administration to stay 
and work land leased from the indigenous 
population, their rights to natural resources 
remained circumscribed. The indenture 
system ended in 1920 but immigration of 
agriculturalists and traders, mostly from 
India, continued until independence.5 
Thus, the Indo-Fijians as seen through the 
HIES of 1990/91 and 2002/03 comprise 
a heterogeneous mix of descendents of 
indentured labourers, and free migrants who 
came as agriculturalists and traders, with the 
latter group having a monopoly on urban 
business. Furthermore, the effects of the 
quarantining of the indigenous population 
into villages and away from enterprise, whilst 
locking the Indo-Fijians into commerce and 
agriculture—mostly on land leased from 
the indigenous population—remains in the 
politics of race and income redistribution 
in contemporary Fiji. Ethnic competition in 
politics, however, took an added impetus 
following independence in 1970.
Since at independence the population 
was divided almost equally between the 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, the 
contests in accessing government privileges, 
including political office, was invariably 
between the two major ethnic groups. The 
‘Others’, meaning people of all other races, 
comprised less than 10 per cent of the total 
population and constituted the more affluent 
Chinese and Europeans, and the relatively 
poorer non-indigenous Pacific Islander 
communities. The divisions between 
the two major ethnic groups are most 
evident in the resource sectors and those 
entailing access to government handouts, 
including access to senior positions within 
the bureaucracy. These privileges entail 
what economists call ‘rents’; that is, a pure 
surplus accruing to the owner due to the 
scarcity value of the product. An élite 
athlete, for example, commands a premium 
on scarce talent much like the holder of an 
exclusive import license. In the case of the 
athlete, however, the talent is innate while 
in the case of the latter, it is a license to ‘print 
money’ conferred on the holder via fiat. The 
distinction is important as the latter can be 
acquired, a fact that induces competition for 
its acquisition. Such rent-seeking activity 
is directly unproductive as the resources 
expended in such competition are to the 
cost of producing other goods and services 
in the economy (Bhagwati 1982). Fractures 
in the community along racial lines occur 
when competition for publicly granted and 
taxpayer-funded privileges intensify—a 
feature characteristic of post-independence 
Fiji. The effects of the ‘rent seeking’ have 
spilled over into coups and resulted in 
political turmoil and the exodus of human 
and financial capital. The cumulative effect 
of the above has been a drag on the rate of 
growth of the economy.
Privileges created via fiat distort 
incentives for expending effort into value-
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adding activity. Access to government 
scholarships for secondary and tertiary 
study, for example, is provided on the basis 
of marks earned in nationally conducted 
external exams. But the bureaucratic 
hurdles facing a Fijian trying to gain entry 
into university and earn a scholarship are 
lower than for the other races. Knowing 
this preference, an indigenous Fijian student 
has a lesser incentive than their Indo-Fijian 
counterpart to excel at studies. The data 
supports this conjecture; indigenous Fijian 
students have, on average, under-performed 
and thus have been unable to fulfill their 
scholarship quotas. Those gaining entry 
to university have, on average, opted for 
the ‘softer’ disciplines knowing that the 
privileges extend to being offered jobs in the 
bureaucracy on graduation. The response 
of the policymakers to the observed under-
performance has been to increase the 
margins of preferences. The net effect is a 
treadmill on a one way street to waste and 
underperformance.
In comparison, the Indian student, 
knowing full well the requirements to over-
perform, has had the opposite incentives: to 
excel and take on the more difficult subjects 
so as to achieve a place at university and a 
job on graduation. The parents have faced 
similar incentives, with Indo-Fijian parents 
having fewer children but on average 
spending more on their education than their 
indigenous Fijian counterparts. The 2002/03 
HIES shows that indigenous Fijians had an 
average 1.9 children per household while 
the corresponding figure for Indo-Fijians 
was 1.2; similarly, indigenous Fijians spent 
F$145 per year on education per child while 
the corresponding figure for Indo-Fijians 
was F$313 (data from Narsey 2006:10, 58). 
Thus, while the intentions of redistributive 
policies may have been to bridge the gap 
between the two major ethnic groups, the 
effects could have been quite the opposite. 
We next consider the most ambitious of the 
redistributive policies and one that was 
specifically couched in terms of a poverty-
reduction strategy.
While the redistributive policies owe 
their origins to the first colonial regime, 
the two coups provided considerable 
thrust. The Interim Government following 
the first coup in 1987 introduced its ‘Nine 
Point Plan’, which included injections of 
funds into Fijian Holdings Limited—a 
company created solely for the benefit of the 
indigenous population—subsidised access 
to finance for the indigenous population 
from state-owned banks, government-
funded business training for indigenous 
Fijians, the establishment of compulsory 
savings schemes for the indigenous 
population, and the reservation of half of 
all government contracts and investments in 
resource-based activities for the indigenous 
population. Indigenisation of the public 
service was also aggressively pursued 
while similar expectations were made of 
the private sector. 
In 2002, following the third coup, 
the Government launched an ambitious 
policy agenda called the Blueprint for the 
Advancement of Fijians and Rotumans, ‘to 
improve the economic and social positions of 
the indigenous population in Fiji society’ (Fiji 
2002:i). The then Prime Minister, Mr Laisenia 
Qarase, in launching the 20-Year Development 
Plan (2001–2020) for the Enhancement of 
Participation of Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans 
in The Socio-Economic Development of Fiji 
rationalised the discriminatory policies on 
the basis of an: ‘expressed recognition of 
the paramountcy of Fijian interests and also 
the principle that the interests of the Fijian 
community are not to be subordinated to 
the interests of the other communities’, as 
per Chapter 2 of the 1997 Fiji Constitution. 
He referred to Clause (k), Section 6 the 
Chapter which allows for ‘affirmative 
action and social justice programs to secure 
effective equality of access to opportunities, 
30
Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 22 Number 2 2007 © Asia Pacific Press
amenities or services for the Fijian and 
Rotuman people, as well as for other 
communities, for women as well as men, and 
for all disadvantaged citizens or groups, are 
based on an allocation of resources broadly 
acceptable to all communities’. 
While the legitimacy (or otherwise) of 
the Blueprint is an issue for debate by the 
experts, I will concentrate on the economic 
impact of the introduced redistributive 
(distortionary) policies on the economy and 
on poverty in particular. Prime Minister 
Qarase used the UNDP’s report to justify 
the proposed affirmative action program, 
claiming that
[t]he 1997 United Nations Poverty Report 
revealed that households with the lowest 
level of income were those in rural areas 
and outer islands. Again, the majority of 
these were Fijians (Fiji 2002:i).
The report, however, stated categorically 
that ‘[p]overty is not concentrated in any 
particular sector of Fiji society but is an 
under-current across all communities’ 
(UNDP 1997:2). The HIES data for 1990/91 
and 2002/03 provides evidence that the 
incidence of poverty amongst the indigenous 
Fijians was no greater than that for Indo-
Fijians, and if anything the converse was 
probably true.
The Prime Minister had also argued that 
the proposed policies were to pre-empt a 
reoccurrence of future coups, recognising 
that past coups had done ‘irreparable 
damage’ to race relations and the economy. 
He thus appealed to the citizenry to accept 
the measures proposed in his government’s 
Blueprint. He was wrong on this count 
as well. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
Blueprint not only failed to prevent another 
coup but was probably critical to the ousting 
of the PM from office in the very next coup. 
The ‘clean up’ campaign that Commodore 
Bainimarama had begun as part of his coup 
was claimed to bring an end to race-based 
politics in Fiji.
The most damning impact of the 
Blueprint is on poverty. The redistributive 
policies were to be used in micromanaging 
the divvying-up of income at the sector and 
subgroup levels. To set some benchmarks, as 
of 2002, indigenous Fijians comprised some 
55 per cent of the population, Indo-Fijians 
41 per cent, and ‘Others’ the remaining 4 
per cent (Table 3). As of 2002, indigenous 
Fijian household income was 77 per cent 
of the figure for Indo-Fijian households; 
the target for 2005 was to bring parity 
between the two groups and by 2015 was to 
achieve parity in each stratum (subgroup) 
of the income. Indigenous Fijians as of 
2002 occupied 51.4 (43.8) per cent of all 
salaried (wage) positions, the target for 
2005 onwards was to achieve parity in 
each class of employment. Indigenous 
Fijians accounted for some 61.5 per cent 
of government positions, a figure well 
above their proportion in total population, 
yet the targets set claim that ‘parity had 
been achieved’. Indigenous Fijians had 
been awarded 42 per cent of public and 
corporate tenders and 54.5 per cent of 
Public Works Department (PWD) tenders; 
the target for 2005 was for parity on value. 
Indigenous Fijians had 53.2 per cent of the 
market for rental of office space; the target 
was to achieve parity on value. Bus, taxi, 
and rental car licenses in Fiji are heavily 
regulated and thus provide significant 
‘rents’ to the owner and therefore are an 
issue of significant competition. As of 2002 
indigenous Fijians accounted for 33 per 
cent of the total Land Transport Authority 
(LTA) licenses; the target for 2005 was set 
at 40 per cent and for 2010 it was set at 50 
per cent; and parity in each subgroup was 
to be achieved from 2010 onwards. These 
are a small sample of the targets set in the 
Blueprint, but they provide a sense of the 
extent of redistribution and the details of 
income and wealth redistribution that were 
being pursued via regulation. 
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It is hard to imagine how these targets 
could be achieved in a market economy 
without constraining competition, taxing 
production, inducing corruption, and 
incurring waste. Just as one example, the 
target for tenders provided by the Public 
Works Department have been achieved, 
but at what cost? Half of the tenders can be 
reserved for indigenous Fijians, but at the 
cost of not getting the most competitive 
supplier of the service. Most targets that 
have been attained are those where the 
government has had a direct role in its 
allocation, but such allocations would have 
been made at the cost of meritocracy. Indo-
Fijians have lost out in being promoted to 
the senior echelons of the public service: a 
fact alleged to be due to the discriminatory 
policies and a reason for many to emigrate. 
It is also common knowledge amongst 
employers that the risks of losing an Indian 
employee to emigration are greater than 
for indigenous Fijians.6 They thus have an 
incentive to hire, train, and promote an 
indigenous Fijian ahead of an equally able 
Indo-Fijian aspirant. Such a process creates 
feedback loops that only encourage greater 
discrimination. Affirmative action programs 
thus have led to a feedback loop with 
increasing disparities in employment and 
dampened productivity. The cumulative 
effects are reduced levels of productivity 
and a lower rate of economic growth than 
what would have prevailed otherwise.
The impact of affirmative action 
programs on poverty can be significant 
and works via three distinct channels. First, 
it is the poor who are most dependent on 
public services such as the provision of 
basic education, primary healthcare, rural 
roads, and crime prevention. Funds used 
for affirmative action programs are lost 
to the provision of the afore-mentioned 
(given the budget constraint) with the 
poor being robbed of the services that they 
otherwise would have received. Second, 
discriminatory policies distort incentives 
such that effort is spent on ‘rent-seeking’ 
Table 3 Affirmative action targets
  2002 level                       Targets 
  (per cent) 2005  2010 2015 2020
Household incomea 77.0 1:1 Achieve parity in main subgroups
Employment 
 Salaried 51.4 To achieve parity in each sub-group
 Wage employment 43.8 50 To achieve parity in each sub-group 
 Government 61.5 Parity achieved
 Public corporations 65.7 To achieve parity in each sub-group
Public and corporate tenders/contracts 42.0 50 Aim for parity on value
Rental of office space 53.2 Maintain share, aim for parity on value
Public Works Department tenders 54.5 Aim for parity on all tenders
Land Transport Authority licences 33.0 40 50 Aim for parity in  
     subgroups
a Compared to Indo-Fijians. 
Source: The data is for a small sample of the targets stipulated in Tables 1 and 2 in Fiji, 2002. 20-Year Development 
Plan (2001–2020) For the Enhancement of Participation of Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the Socio-Economic 
Development of Fiji, Parliamentary Paper No. 73, Government Printer, Suva.
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activity rather than on value-adding effort. 
Such distortions spill across the whole 
economy when the public sector is the lead 
sector, being the largest single employer, 
and thus sets the employment conditions 
and wages for the formal sector as a whole. 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that corruption in Fiji has risen 
significantly since the first coup (see Keith-
Reid 2000). Third, the redistributions 
sanctioned via affirmative action programs 
can drive a wedge between the incomes of 
the poor and the rich. It is only those with 
the means and the information that are 
able to access the privileges accorded via 
affirmative action programs.  It is unlikely 
that a poor villager, for example, will apply 
for a taxi license, a government tender, or 
for subsidised credit. These privileges have 
been utilised by the élite with the means and 
the information to do so.
The case of a taxpayer funded bailout to 
the tune of F$200 million of the National Bank 
of Fiji (NBF) for bad loans made between 
1988 and 1992 following the first coup 
illustrates the impact of affirmative action 
programs on poverty. Justice Shameem, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions who 
was responsible for the investigations 
following the exposure of the abuses by 
the media, noted at a workshop on anti-
corruption organised by the Fiji Chapter of 
Transparency International that 
…what was supposed to be an 
affirmative action program to advance 
soft loans to the disadvantaged 
indigenous population was in fact a 
slush fund for the privileged, many of 
whom were not indigenous and some 
of whom were cronies of people in 
authority (Fiji Times, 23 March 2007).
Ratuva (2002) estimates losses of around 
F$400 million—equal to some 30 per cent 
of the 1987 GDP for the nation as a whole—
from affirmative action programs. Thus, the 
affirmative action policies, provided under 
the rationale of reducing income inequality, 
have done the very opposite as they have 
lent themselves to abuse. While the poor 
miss out on quality public services, the 
non-favoured élite are able to circumvent 
the constraints by purchasing these services 
while the favoured group captures the 
proceeds from public handouts.
In the meantime, the economy suffered 
on several fronts including a rise in ‘rent-
seeking’ and thus unproductive activity, the 
loss of human and financial capital as those 
with the means and the incentives emigrated, 
the demand for improved governance 
suffered as the middle class shrank, while the 
poor bear the brunt of a slowing economy as 
they have no escape from their predicament. 
The economy, consequently, stagnated 
(Chand 2007, this issue). The politics of 
redistribution that benefited the élite, 
together with a porous border that has 
allowed the middle class, Indo-Fijians in 
particular, to emigrate has contributed to a 
rise in poverty.  The military takeover of 2006 
has been justified as a ‘clean up’ of corruption 
and the race-based politics. If successful, this 
may see a (slow) turnaround in the economy, 
the effects of which may trickle down to the 
poor over time. The coup7 could equally 
displace one set of ‘rent-seeking’ élite with 
another without changing the underlying 
incentives for and impacts of redistributive 
politics on the poor: which of the above 
prevails only time will tell.
This article has argued against poverty-
increasing government redistributions, 
particularly those that distort incentives for 
value-adding effort. It is not an argument 
against redistribution for poverty reduction 
but one against poverty-increasing transfers. 
The rising incidence of poverty cannot be left 
to go unchecked as its steady march to ‘50/50 
by 2020’ is well underway. Transfers to the 
poor directly rather than via the medium 
of ethnicity would be a better means of 
addressing this challenge. I suggested this 
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change a decade ago (Chand 1997), but the 
politics of such a change then was obviously 
not opportune. It may be now, but only if, in 
Gillion’s terms, everyone in Fiji is equally 
accepted as citizens and Fiji does penance for 
the mistakes of the past (Gillion 1962:201).
Conclusion
This article makes four principal claims 
regarding poverty and redistribution in 
post-independence Fiji. First, that poverty 
has been on a steady upwards trend since 
independence, rising at a rate of one 
percentage point per year. One in every 
four in the population were unable to afford 
the minimum requirements for living in 
1990/91—this figure had risen to one in 
every three by the next HIES of 2002/03; 
and, extrapolating on past trends, one in 
every two will be in poverty by the year 
2020. The last would bring new meaning to 
the Blueprint of the Qarase Government that 
had espoused a vision of half of the economic 
wealth of the country being in the hands of 
the indigenous population by the year 2020, 
thus their slogan of ‘50/50 by 2020’. 
Second, affirmative action programs, 
of which the blueprint was their last 
manifestation, have been adopted since 
the beginning of colonisation when the 
first resident Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, 
experimented with ‘non-transformative’ 
colonisation in this archipelagic colony 
(Veracini 2007). Indigenous Fijians were 
to be quarantined from modern commerce 
and particularly from the likely abuse 
from the resident European planters. 
Migrant labour, the majority from India, 
was brought in to save the indigenous 
Fijians from this predicament and grow the 
economy. Governor Gordon supplemented 
the meager resources he had at his disposal 
to govern the colony by drawing in the 
tribal chiefs as part of his administration. 
The Governor also outlawed alienation of 
land, established a council of tribal chiefs 
as custodians of the resource, and allowed 
the leasing of this land by the immigrants 
but with the payments being channeled 
via the chiefs. The last entrenched the 
position of chiefs in Fijian society, domestic 
politics, and the economy by giving them 
the imprimatur of the colonial authority. 
This was the beginning of the creation of 
unequal groups within Fiji: the hierarchy 
comprised the Governor at the apex, 
followed by the chiefs, with the European 
planters somewhere in between, the rest of 
the indigenous population next, and Indian 
migrant workers last.8
Third, income and wealth redistribution 
on the basis of ethnicity has lent itself to 
capture by the élite and particularly so in 
the heightened climate of racial segregation 
following the first coup. Thus, while the 
1997 Constitution highlighted the poverty-
reduction rational for redistribution, politics 
consolidated a system of redistribution 
that was poverty-increasing. Household-
level data show that poverty is prevalent 
in all communities, and that indigenous 
Fijians are no worse off than Indo-Fijians 
in terms of the proportion of the population 
in poverty. Post-coup administrations 
in Fiji, however, have argued otherwise; 
claiming that indigenous Fijians face 
greater disadvantage than Indo-Fijians. 
Surprisingly, these claims have principally 
been based on the Fiji Poverty Report (UNDP 
1997). These claims have been used to 
rationalise affirmative action programs 
entailing redistribution of taxpayer funded 
handouts to the indigenous population. This 
ethnicity-based redistribution has been anti-
poor; an observation consistent with earlier 
findings of Cameron (1983) and Stavenuiter 
(1983). It has also been a drag on the growth 
of the economy, and a major source of 
corruption and abuse of public office. The 
discriminatory practices, moreover, have 
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induced emigration and capital flight, thus 
leaving those without ‘wings’, the immobile 
poor in the main, face the brunt of the costs 
of discrimination.
Last, the economy has largely stagnated 
since the first coup. Per capita income 
since 1987 has grown at less than 1.5 per 
cent per annum. Investment rates have 
plummeted following each coup while 
annual emigration of skilled personnel has 
doubled since the first. The poor usually 
have only their labour to sell and often 
at unskilled wage rates. Average daily 
real wages fell in the first two decades of 
independence while income inequality 
increased in this period: the two together 
imply that the poor must have lost ground 
in terms of per capita income.
The 2006 coup was rationalised as being 
undertaken to ‘clean up’ the government of 
corruption and to bring race-based politics 
to an end. The intentions are laudable 
but only time will tell if the effects will be 
consistent with the intentions.
Notes
1   This claim is subject to all available data on 
this issue.
2   Fiji has had five-yearly national development 
plans dating from independence in 1970 
to 1991, each of which emphasised broad-
based growth and improved access to basic 
services to the disadvantaged and the poor. 
The government created a Poverty Taskforce 
in 1991 to recommend polices to reduce the 
burgeoning levels of poverty.
3   Income inequality in Fiji, as measured by 
the Gini coefficient (which ranges from 0 for 
perfect equality and 1 for perfect inequality), 
rose between 1977 and 1991 from 0.43 to 0.49 
(UNDP 1994).
4   Note that ‘Others’ have the highest income, 
dragging the national average up. The figures 
for 2002/03 are from Narsey (2006).
5   See Lal (2004) on the origins of Fijian Indians 
and an account of the experiences of the 
indentured labourers in Fiji, and Gillion 
(1962) for an account of the separatist 
polices of the colonial administration, thus 
giving legitimacy for racial segregation and 
ensuing political and social ramifications of 
immigration for Fiji since.
6   Frank Bainimarama has claimed that ‘[r]acist 
policies really have been the main cause of 
brain drain in the public sector since the 1987 
coups [and] racism in the private sector also 
was the major cause of the brain drain there’ 
(reported by Fijilive, 1 April 2007).
7   This was a military takeover without the 
abrogation of the constitution or a revolution, 
thus it may not amount to being a coup in the 
strict sense of this term.
8   Remnants of this hierarchy and the Gordon 
experiment remain in contemporary Fiji. 
I cannot help but ask if the indentured, 
often illiterate and uninformed, Indian 
labourer was recompense for the atrocities 
of European colonialism elsewhere.
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